The Fact-Value Distinction

The fact-value distinction is the distinction between statements about what is the case ('facts') and statements about what ought to be the case ('values').

Facts can, in principle, be tested or supported by observation and evidence: for example, 'This drug reduces blood pressure.' Values involve judgements about what is good, bad, desirable, right or wrong: for example, 'We ought to reduce high blood pressure.'

The distinction is closely associated with David Hume, who argued that an 'ought' cannot simply be derived from an 'is'. Knowing the facts does not, by itself, tell us what we should value or do. This is sometimes called the is-ought problem.

The distinction does not mean that facts and values are completely unrelated. Factual information can be highly relevant to a value judgement, but some additional value premise is normally required. For example, 'This policy will reduce poverty' does not by itself establish 'therefore we ought to adopt it'; that conclusion also depends upon the value judgement that reducing poverty is desirable.